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HEALTH AND SAFETY

cently promulgated regulations.
Most of its sunset actions have been
based on analyses by the now defunct CWPS, which did excellent
work but often did not have sufficient political authority to halt the
undesirable policies. As the OMB
group gets past the recent batch of
regulations, it should begin to delve
much more deeply into the huge
body of older regulations, which
will mean doing ex post evaluations
in order to learn which rules have
been effective and which have not.
This will require a substantial expansion in OMB's policy analysis
capability.
In some of the sunset actions
taken so far, Congress or the agency
itself has taken the initiative. It was
Congress, for example, that forced
the CPSC to relax its lawn mower
standard a bit. For the most part,
however, OMB has led the way, with
the agencies cooperating more than
they used to but still much less than
a regulatory reformer would like.
Agency Performance and Policies.
Let me now turn briefly to the risk
regulation agencies. First, the agency I know best, OSHA. Under its
new leadership, there has been a
most welcome decrease in the agency's antagonism toward the business
community, and there has been,
largely at OMB's urging, greater emphasis on regulatory analysis. But
OSHA Administrator Thorne Auchter's biggest change has been to exempt low-risk firms from inspections. While well-intended, this is
the wrong approach. A scheme for
targeting inspections is desirable
and long overdue, but accident statistics are not, by themselves, a
sufficient guide to where we want to
enforce health and safety standards. OSHA should be emphasizing
health, not safety, and accident statistics primarily reflect safety. In
addition, rather than simply focusing on the overall accident rate,
OSHA should start worrying about
the compliance costs it is imposing.
Technological efficiency matters,
and an efficient industrial technology may be high risk rather than
low risk.
It is interesting to note that,
even with OMB largely determining
the agenda for changes in OSHA

standards, we do not yet see any
new approaches to job risk regulation. Instead, the agency has been
weeding out some of its most illconceived individual regulations.
But those are not always the most
damaging ones. For example, the
diving standard is a bad regulation
by almost any criterion, but it's not
very consequential in the total
scheme of things. The lead standard
is a good target for sunset review,
but that task is not nearly as important as revamping all of the
agency's safety standards. And the
agency's decision to review its carcinogen policy was a better idea before the cotton-dust decision than
after it. Nevertheless, especially
since the potential cost of this policy is in the hundreds of billions, I
still think it's important to lay out
policy criteria in this area. These
should include information as an
alternative to regulation.
Perhaps one reason why we
don't yet have major innovations
from OSHA is that they are still bottled up within the new regulatory
oversight process. For example,
the chemical labeling regulations,
which OMB is now considering,
could be the best OSHA policy ever.
Chemical labeling focuses on health
and not safety, and it works
through the market by providing information. For this approach to be
useful, however, it should utilize an
easily understood hazard-warning
system (like that now employed by
the paint industry) rather than formidable listings of chemical compounds (as proposed by OSHA in
January 1981). Moreover, OSHA
should couple any chemical labeling policy to a commitment to forswear the substance-by-substance
regulation it has pursued in the
past. The decision it makes on
chemical labeling will signal the degree to which the agency is charting
a new course instead of simply tinkering with its arsenal of existing
regulations.
The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has also been relatively active. Most
recently it rolled back its passive
restraint standard. The question I
have as an outsider is, why did it do
this? An analysis by economist William Nordhaus of Yale showed that

the benefits of air bags would exceed the costs. Does NHTSA have
some other analysis that showed the
opposite? By justifying its decision
on the grounds that previous studies had reached conflicting conclusions, NHTSA opened itself to the
charge that it is more interested in
helping the auto industry than in
trying to select policies on their
merits where the evidence is unclear, as the evidence usually is. At
the least, what we have here is an
instance of failing to articulate
clearly the economic rationale behind its policies.
NHTSA has been much less venturesome when it comes to shifting
its overall regulatory approach: it
still refuses to calculate the cost per
life of any of its regulations. Unlike
OSHA, it has not yet placed its regulatory analyses on a sound basis by
insisting, at the very minimum, that
cost-effectiveness tests be performed.
On the brighter side, NHTSA is
reconsidering its standard to make
bumpers withstand a five-mile-perhour impact. I should emphasize
that this standard has no safety effect whatsoever and is intended only
to save consumers money. Yet, its
costs so clearly exceed its benefits
that it is hard to justify from a consumer welfare standpoint. More fundamentally, NHTSA has never provided any evidence that the market
doesn't work in this area. And finally, in a classic case of bureaucratic
confusion, even as NHTSA has been
pursuing more durable bumpers it
has also been thinking about making bumpers softer so that they
won't injure pedestrians. Clearly
NHTSA ought to forget about bumpers altogether.
Moving on to the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC),
I find it a unique case among the
health and safety agencies. Its budget has been cut the most, about in
half over the last few years. And
unlike the other agencies, it is
locked in not by its legislation, but
by its leadership-its five commissioners. The CPSC could, but does
not, stop using its Section 15 authority under the Consumer Product
Safety Act, which gives it carte
blanche to ban or recall any product at will (without issuing regula-
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"THANKS, PAL-AO ISTAHRE AWY WAY YOU CAN
KEEP THOSE TRICKY JAPANESE AUTO MAKERS
FROM INSTALLIN6 THEM INTEIR CARS?'

(@ 1981 by Herblock in the Washington Post.

tions to guide businessmen). It
could, but does not, abandon its
reliance on risk as the paramount
policy concern in favor of recognizing the important trade-offs that
need to be made. Moreover, it has
a positive mandate, stated clearly
in the act, to pursue informational
strategies as an alternative to command-and-control regulations. But
it has largely ignored this mandate.
To repeat, the only real constraints
on the CPSC are its commissioners.
As yet, none of them has shown any
vision on how the agency's policies
should be redirected.
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At the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), policy reform
has moved slowly, pretty much as in
the past. The FDA seems to be
speeding up the approval time for
new drugs, but its overall emphasis
on risk reduction rather than benefit-cost balancing has remained intact.
Let me briefly turn to the policy
changes I'd like to see. First the
CPSC should be reorganized into
an executive branch agency (perhaps within the Department of
Commerce), led by a single admin-
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istrator. This would be much more
effective than the present chaotic
rule by committee. In addition, if
any agency needs close regulatory
oversight, this one is it. The reorganized agency should base its regulations on a benefit-cost test and
rely on informational alternatives
to standards.
For the rest of the risk regulation agencies, we need two things.
First, as for statutory changes, there
are problems not only with the
Clean Air Act, but also with the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
the Delaney amendment, and so on.
These problems are related, and
dealing with them requires a clearly
articulated policy statement from
the White House. In particular, the
administration should call for the
abandonment of risk-based regulation.
Second, it is not sufficient for
these agencies simply to exhibit less
antibusiness bias, do less, and end
up with fewer regulations on the
books. We need to bring about a
basic shift in approach-one that
limits interventions to situations of
market inadequacy, that emphasizes working with rather than
against market forces (for example,
providing information instead of
imposing rigid standards), and that
experiments with innovative strategies. In the case of OSHA, we should
focus on health hazards rather-than
safety hazards. For auto safety, we
should calculate the cost-effectiveness of all of NHTSA's and the
Transportation Department's policies on safety-from roads to cars
to guard rails-and try to reallocate
resources across these areas efficiently.
Getting such a new long-term
direction for regulatory policy is
perhaps most important of all. At
present, many of these administrators seem so unclear about where
they ultimately want to take their
agencies that one wonders if they
even know themselves.
WITH RESPECT TO an overall report
card, NHTSA and OSHA merit fair
marks on an absolute scale, which
is an improvement over past years;
NRC and the FDA should get pretty
much the same grade as before;
and the CPSC continues to fail,
maybe even more completely than
a
in the past.

